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To ensure sufﬁcient investment in electricity generation capacity, mechanisms such as strategic reserves
are being considered or already implemented. We analyze the effectiveness of a strategic reserve in the
presence of a growing portfolio share of renewable energy sources (RES) with EMLab-Generation, an
agent-based electricity market model. A strategic reserve can stabilize investment, but within limits.
Uncertainty regarding future demand may cause the market to become instable, potentially leading to
periods with very high electricity prices. In the presence of a large share of variable renewable energy
sources, the reserve design should be adjusted or replaced by an alternative capacity mechanism.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
We investigate the effectiveness of a strategic reserve with
respect to incentivizing adequate generation investment in an
electricity system with strong growth in the portfolio share of
intermittent or variable renewable energy sources (RES). The
increasing reliance on variable renewable electricity generation
makes cost recovery more uncertain for thermal power plants in
Europe. Their capacity is needed when the variable resources are
not sufﬁciently available, but the number of hours per year that
they operate declines when the share of renewable energy in-
creases. In theory, this should not affect their business case as long
as scarcity prices are allowed to rise high enough, but investment
becomes riskier as their revenues come to depend increasingly on
infrequent but high scarcity prices. When other causes of risk and
uncertainty are taken into account, such as carbon-policy uncer-
tainty, fuel-price uncertainty, and uncertain demand growth, there
arises a legitimate concern that there will not be enough invest-
ment in thermal power generation capacity and that unproﬁtable
thermal power plants might be decommissioned. In their paper on
the decommissioning of power stations between 2001 and 2005,
Wissen and Nicolosi (2007) contend that although much of the
observed decommissioning was most likely due to other reasons,
there is a possibility that some of these units would have remainedat).operational in absence of growth of renewable energy (Sensfuß
et al., 2008). Similarly, Nicolosi and Fürsch (2009) and Bushnell
(2010) expect a lower share of base-load power plants in the sup-
ply mix over the long run. More recently, plants in the Netherlands
are being mothballed due to a combination of excess capacity and
shorter running hours due to the import of variable renewable
energy from Germany (Straver, 2014).
In response to the rising share of renewables and the vulnera-
bilities of the electricity markets discussed in literature (Borenstein
et al., 1995; Brown, 2001; De Vries and Hakvoort, 2003; De Vries,
2007; Joskow and Tirole, 2007; Joskow, 2008; Keppler, 2014;
Perez-Arriaga, 2001; Stoft, 2002; Woo et al., 2003), capacity
mechanisms are being considered or already implemented in many
countries (ACER, 2013; BMWi, 2015; Creti et al., 2012; DECC, 2014;
Mastropietro et al., 2015; RTE, 2014; Spees et al., 2013). For our
purposes, capacity mechanisms refer to policy instruments for
ensuring adequate investment in generation capacity; in the Eu-
ropean debate, they are also called capacity remuneration mecha-
nisms. The impacts and the concerns regarding implementation of
different capacity mechanisms have been discussed in depth in
literature (Cramton et al., 2013; Finon, 2015, 2013; Meyer and Gore,
2015; Newbery and Grubb, 2014; Regulatory Assistance Project,
2013; Rodilla and Batlle, 2013, 2012). One such option is a stra-
tegic reserve (Cramton et al., 2013; Rodilla and Batlle, 2013), typi-
cally consisting of generators with high operating costs and/or
demand-side resources that are contracted by the transmission
system operator (TSO) and are dispatched when the market does
not provide sufﬁcient generation capacity. Conceptually, a strategic
Fig. 1. Example of impact of strategic reserve on the supply curve (De Vries, 2004).
1 Supply ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of available supply at peak over peak
demand.
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depending onwhether the decision to dispatch the reserve units on
short notice as a function of the electricity price or some other
variable. In Sweden, a strategic reserve was implemented to pre-
vent old units from being decommissioned, despite their limited
economic prospects. In southern Germany, a strategic reserve is
currently used to allow the transmission system operator to pur-
chase electricity from units that are more expensive than the
market price, but that are locally needed due to network con-
straints. In this case, the reserve is used for congestion
management.
The creation of a strategic reserve itself might not change the
volume of available generation capacity, as it simply transfers the
control of some power stations to the transmission system operator
(TSO). The exception is if, by doing so, it prevents plant from being
decommissioned. In case there is not enough available generation
capacity, the TSO dispatches the strategic reserve at a price above
the variable costs of the generation units. This will cause the
average electricity price to increase and thus stimulate investment
in generation capacity. The market design challenge, therefore, is to
ensure that the dispatch price of the reserve provides an adequate
investment incentive.
We analyze the effectiveness of a strategic reserve in providing
reliability in the presence of a growing share of renewable energy
supply in the supply mix. We also consider short-term and long-
term effects on economic efﬁciency. We expand an existing
agent-based model of electricity markets called EMLab-Generation
(De Vries et al., 2013; Richstein et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2014). In the
next section, we describe the fundamentals of designing and
operating a strategic reserve. In Section 3, the EMLab-Generation
agent-based model, the implementation of a strategic reserve in
this model and calculation of the strategic reserve parameters are
explained. Section 4 describes the scenarios used for our model
runs. In Section 5, we present the results of our analysis of the
effectiveness of a strategic reservewithout andwith a large share of
renewable energy sources. We test it in aMonte Carlo-style analysis
with uncertain demand growth rate and fuel-price developments.
The indicators that we use in this analysis are described in detail in
Section 5.1. The conclusions are summarized in Section 6.
2. Designing and operating a strategic reserve
2.1. Overview
We deﬁne a strategic reserve as a set of power plants and/or
interruptible demand contracts that are controlled by the trans-
mission system operator, to be deployed during shortages (De
Vries, 2004; De Vries and Heijnen, 2006; Rodilla and Batlle,
2013). We analyze a strategic reserve that is dispatched when the
market price exceeds a certain level. We do not consider alternative
dispatch criteria, such as those based on the reserve margin
(deﬁned as the available generation capacity over the peak de-
mand). In the basic strategic-reserve design, the system operator
contracts electricity generation units with high operating costs
(ideally, the last units in the merit order) and offers their electricity
to the market at a price (PSR), which is well above their variable cost
(see Fig. 1). The pays the owners of these power plants their annual
operations and maintenance costs. If the reserve capacity is dis-
patched, the operator pays the owners of these power plants their
marginal cost of generation. Thus the operator pays all the reserve
costs and keeps (most of) the proﬁt when the reserve is dispatched.
From the perspective of the operator, these proﬁts should cover the
ﬁxed costs, but the operator takes the ﬁnancial risk of keeping the
reserve units available. In case the operator is unable to recover all
its cost of contracting the reserve, the remaining costs aresocialized (or spread across usage) as part of the network or system
tariffs.2.2. Reserve design
A strategic reserve with a price-based dispatch criterion, as
analyzed here, withdraws a certain volume of generation capacity
from the market and makes it available at a price that is (sub-
stantially) higher than its variable cost. This should stimulate in-
vestment in generation capacity as explained by Stoft (2002). The
level of the reserve dispatch price (PSR) is a key factor, as it effec-
tively caps the market price (Stoft, 2002; De Vries and Heijnen,
2008). It therefore determines the strength of investment incen-
tive, and, as a consequence, the total equilibrium volume of gen-
eration capacity and hence the level of generation adequacy. In
principle, the reserve price PSR should be determined such that the
revenues earned by the power producers in the presence of the
strategic reserve are equivalent to the revenues that they would
have earned in an energy only market. In a perfect market, if the
supply ratio1 was optimal without the reserve, the reserve should
lead to the same supply ratio. In case of market imperfections that
cause insufﬁcient investment, the reserve could provide compen-
sation by raising generation companies' average revenues. The
determination of an optimal supply ratio is beyond our paper's
scope. In theory, it should follow from the minimization of social
costs, but in practice it is often determined by the regulator. In our
research, we focus on the effectiveness of a strategic reserve in
providing reliability without and with a large share of renewable
energy sources. A second criterion is the impact of the strategic
reserve on economic efﬁciency.
The only time when the reserve price does not function as a
maximum price is the rare occasionwhen the reserve is exhausted.
Then the price may increase to the value of lost load if there are no
more demand-side resources available. If the reserve functions
well, it has attracted sufﬁcient investment in generation capacity
and is exhausted only under rare circumstances. As a result, gen-
erators lose some peak revenues.With awell-designed reserve, this
loss is offset by the fact that the reserve increases the market price
up to PSR during other hours, namely when there is no absolute
shortage but the reserve is needed to meet demand. The challenge
is to design the reserve so it balances these two effects. Conse-
quently, in a market with a strategic reserve, price spikes up to PSR
P.C. Bhagwat et al. / Utilities Policy 39 (2016) 13e28 15occur more frequently than scarcity prices would occur in a system
without a reserve, but these price spikes are lower. The lower but
more frequent price spikes should make electricity prices more
predictable and investment consequently less risky, according to
Stoft (2002). We describe this change in the shape of the pri-
ceeduration curve in the Section 3.2.
2.3. The dismantling paradox
During the development of this model, we came upon an
interesting long-term effect of a strategic reserve, which we label
“the dismantling paradox”. In the long run, a strategic reserve may
distort the merit order by supporting power generation units that
should be dismantled and which may also be the most polluting. A
strategic reserve may be intended to prolong the service life of old
power plants, but over time this may cause a dilemma when the
oldest plant in the system is no longer necessary or should be
replaced for economic reasons. Investment in new plants, new
interruptible demand contracts or declining demand, in combina-
tion with the aging of the plants in the reserve, may create a situ-
ation in which the marginal plant no longer is economic, even as
part of the reserve. However, if the system operator ceases to
contract it, its owner could offer it to themarket at its marginal cost,
which is below the reserve price. This plant would then be the last
to be dispatched before the reserve, running at least as many hours
as the reserve, while being less efﬁcient than the plants in the
reserve. As this would artiﬁcially increase its operating hours,
relative to its position at the end of the merit order, it could make
the plant proﬁtable again, causing it to continue to be proﬁtable
despite its position at the end of the merit order. The extent to
which this occurs depends on the shapes of the supply and demand
functions. We encountered this behavior in our model runs.
A similar risk exists for demand resources with relatively high
activation costs (resources that require a relatively high remuner-
ation per MWh of load reduction). If cheaper demand resources
become available, the system operator would prefer them. How-
ever, if the operator does not contract the more expensive demand
resources, the latter may be offered to the market and dispatched
before the strategic reserve, out of merit. A key difference with
generators with high variable costs is that demand resources do not
age and do not need to be dismantled. The advent of cheaper de-
mand resources may simply mean that size of the strategic reserve
can be reduced.
3. Model description
3.1. EMLab-generation
EMLab-Generation2 is an agent-based model (ABM) (De Vries
et al., 2013; Richstein et al., 2014). The model has been developed
for the purpose of analyzing long-term impacts of different
renewable energy, carbon emissions, and resource adequacy pol-
icies and their interactions, that is, “what-if” scenarios rather than
forecasts or optimizations. It is a bottom-up model in which actors,
the main ones of which are power companies, are modeled as
agents who make decisions, e.g. bidding on electricity market and
investment, independently from each other (Chappin, 2011; Dam
et al., 2013). The model functions within the AgentSpring frame-
work (Chmieliauskas et al., 2012). The main external drivers for
change in this model are the fuel prices, electricity demand sce-
narios, and policy instruments such as capacity mechanisms. The
main outputs are investment behavior and its impact on electricity2 http://emlab.tudelft.nl/.prices, generator cost recovery, CO2 emissions, fuel consumption,
and system reliability. The agents base their investment and
dispatch decisions on scenario variables, such as electricity demand
and fuel prices, and on endogenous variables such as the electricity
price. A key advantage of this approach is that it is not necessary to
make assumptions about the reaction of the system as a whole to
policy changes, as the system-level performance is a resultant of all
agents' actions (Chappin, 2011). Therefore, assumptions must be
made only at the level of the agents.
EMLab-Generation was developed in order to model questions
that arise from the heterogeneity of the electricity sector between
EU member states (De Vries et al., 2013; Richstein et al., 2015a,
2015b, 2014). In connected electricity markets, multiple policy in-
struments (such as renewable energy and generation adequacy
policies) may inﬂuence investment in generation capacity. To
assess these, the model simulates several decades, with a time step
of one year. We represent the uncertainty regarding fuel prices and
demand growth, varying these two scenario parameters in multiple
runs, Monte-Carlo style.
In the model, generation companies interact with each other in
the electricity market. They make decisions regarding capital in-
vestments, bids into the electricity markets, and purchases of car-
bon credits. Choices about dispatch are affected by demand, fuel
prices, electricity and CO2 prices, and the fuel efﬁciency of gener-
ators. Investment decisions by agents are based on the expected net
present value of new plant. Power producers make investment
decisions sequentially in an iterative process. The investment de-
cision of each power producer affects the investment decision of
the next producer by changing its forecast of available capacity. In
reality, as construction permits are typically made public, we as-
sume that power producers have full information about investment
decisions that have already been made by competitors. The itera-
tive process stopswhen no participant is willing to invest further. In
order to prevent a bias towards any particular agent, the sequence
of power producers is determined randomly in every time step. The
investment algorithm is presented in a ﬂowchart in the Appendix
(see Fig. 19) and a detailed description is available in Richstein et al.
(2014). There are 14 power-plant technology options available to a
generator. Future development of these technologies is modeled as
a gradual decrease in costs and improvement in operational pa-
rameters, such as efﬁciency. The attributes of the power plants,
such as fuel efﬁciencies, investment costs, operation and mainte-
nance costs, and technological learning, are based on data from the
IEAWorld Energy Outlook 2011, New Policies Scenario (IEA, 2011).
The development of renewable energy generation is implemented
as investment by a renewable ‘target investor’. If investment in
renewable energy source (RES) capacity by the competitive power
producers is lower than the government target, the target investor
will invest in additional RES capacity in order to meet the target
even to the extent that they do not recover their costs in the
market. This simulates the current subsidy-driven development of
renewable energy sources.
Electricity demand is represented in the form of a load-duration
curve. The curve changes each year as demand changes. Empirical
load data is approximated by a step function with 20 segments of
variable length (see Fig. 2). Within a one-year time step, the elec-
tricity market is cleared for each step of the load-duration curve.
The intermittency of renewables is a short-term effect, which is
difﬁcult to implement in a long-term model such as EMLab-
Generation. In this model, intermittency is approximated by vary-
ing the contribution of these technologies (availability as percent-
age of installed capacity) in different segments of the load-duration
function. The segment-dependent availability is varied linearly
from a high contribution to the base segments, to very low
contribution to the highest peak segment. A detailed description of
Fig. 2. Load-duration curve in EMLab-Generation for one country.
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Richstein et al. (2015a, 2015b, 2014). Table 2 in the Appendix
summarizes all the assumptions regarding the power generation
technologies. The most important advantage of working with a
load-duration curve is that it allows for a shorter run time, enabling
a larger number of Monte-Carlo simulations within a practical time
frame (Richstein et al., 2014).
In this paper we review the impact of a strategic reserve on a
single, closed market. The electricity market is modeled as an
abstraction of a hourly power system (Richstein et al., 2014). During
the electricity market clearing process, each generation company
submits a price-volume bid pair for each power plant that it owns
and for each of the segments of the load-duration curve. The
highest accepted bid sets the electricity market-clearing price for
that segment and that market. If demand is higher than supply, the
clearing price is set to the value of lost load. The overview of the
model activities during a time step is presented in a ﬂowchart in the
Appendix (see Fig. 18). A detailed description of this model is
available online in the EMLab-Generation technical report and
previously published work (De Vries et al., 2013; Richstein et al.,
2015a, 2015b, 2014).
3.2. The strategic-reserve algorithm
The strategic reserve is modeled as an extension of EMLab-
Generation. Here we describe the algorithms that determine the
behavior of the strategic-reserve operator in our model. The oper-
ator contracts the most expensive power plants, based on their
variable costs, until the reserve has the required volume. The
operator selects these plants because they are the least likely to run,
so the opportunity cost of withdrawing them from themarket is the
smallest. This means that, if a tendering process were organized,
they would have made the lowest bids. The strategic reserve only
contracts complete power plants, thus the full capacity of the last
required power plant is contracted.
The owners of the contracted power plants are paid the annual
fixed operating costs of the plants and the plants are offered to the
electricity spot market at the strategic reserve dispatch price (PSR).
In the event that this capacity is sold in the market and dispatched,
the strategic reserve operator keeps the revenue earned by the
generating units in the reserve (RGR) above their variable costs of
generation (VC). This can be deﬁned as the revenue of the strategic
reserve operator (RSR) (see Equation (1)).
RSR ¼ RGR  VC (1)
If all non-contracted generators are running and the reserve is
also not large enough to meet demand, there is a physical shortage
of electricity. In this case, the market price is set equal to the value
of lost load (VOLL) in our model. It is assumed that the system
operator passes on the reserve costs to the consumers via thenetwork tariffs. The process of contracting power plants for the
strategic reserve is presented in a ﬂowchart in Appendix (Fig. 20).
3.3. Determining the strategic-reserve parameters
We now describe how the key parameters of the reserve are
chosen. The regulator needs to choose either the reserve size or the
dispatch price PSR and calculate the other variable so that the
average revenues of the generators are just sufﬁcient to remunerate
their investments. The regulator could also implement a step-wise
dispatch price function by making capacity from the reserve
available at different price levels, but for simplicity we consider a
single dispatch price for the entire reserve. In our model, ﬁxing the
reserve volume was most practical. The system operator in the
model chooses the size of the strategic reserve as a fraction FSR of
expected peak demand to be contracted. In every time step, the
total capacity contracted into the strategic reserve (CSR) is calcu-
lated from the fraction of the reserve volume (FSR) over peak load,
multiplied by the peak load (VPL) (see Equation (2)).
CSR ¼ FSR* VPL (2)
In calculating the reserve price from the reserve volume, we
apply the principle that (in a perfect market) the reserve should not
change the average electricity price. Thus, the total revenues
earned by the generators during the hours when the reserve sets
the price in a market with a strategic reserve should be equal to the
revenues earned by the power producers during the same hours in
an energy-only market. In other words, the revenue loss that
generators experience due to fewer hours of scarcity prices should
be perfectly compensated by an increase in revenues during hours
when the reserve has the effect of raising the electricity price from
the marginal cost of generation to the reserve price. This is illus-
trated in Fig. 3 with a simpliﬁed priceeduration curve where the
area under the curve represents the revenues earned by the power
producers. The reserve price (indicated by line FG) must be
adjusted such that the area under polygon ABCDE must be made
equal to area under polygon FGDE for a ﬁxed reserve volume.
In order to determine the dimensions of the strategic reserve, a
baseline scenario with ﬁxed fuel prices and no demand growth is
run 120 times over a time horizon of 40 year. A priceeduration
curve is created from the electricity prices in these runs. Next, the
reserve volume is set as 6% of the peak demand, as at this volume of
capacity the reserve must be active for 10 h annually on average.
Since we consider electricity prices from all the runs as separate
data points, this reserve volume would lead to 48,000 h with
reserve prices (PSR) over the entire simulation (of 10 h * 40 years *
120 runs). As we assume that the presence of a strategic reserve
does not affect electricity prices during the hours that the reserve is
not activated, we restrict our analysis to the segments of the load-
duration curve during which the reserve would be activated, if
present.
In the next step, the total revenue generated during the 48,000
peak hours of the combined load-duration curve is calculated. The
model has a segmented load-duration curve, so the total revenue
earned by the competitive generators is calculated as the summa-
tion of the revenue per segment of the load-duration curve for all
the segments that together make up the 48,000 peak hours. The
revenues per segment are equal to the product of the price, the
number of hours in the segment and the volume of generation in
the segment. Total generator revenues in an energy-only market
Reom are given by:
Reom ¼
Xn
i¼1
Pi * hi * gi (3)
Fig. 3. Modiﬁcation to the peak of the priceeduration curve due to a strategic reserve.
P.C. Bhagwat et al. / Utilities Policy 39 (2016) 13e28 17Here, n is the number of segments in the load-duration curve
during which the reserve would be activated, Pi is the price in
segment i, hi is the number of hours in segment i and gi is the total
generation in segment i.
If a strategic reserve is implemented, the price during these
segments is equal to the reserve dispatch price PSR. Then, the
generation companies' revenues RSR are determined by the reserve
dispatch price instead of the market price:
RSR ¼
Xn
i¼1
PSR * hi * gi (4)
If the strategic reserve is not to change average revenues,
Equation (3) must equal (4). This way, the strategic reserve price PSR
is calculated.3.4. Strategic reserve in a static thermal-only scenario
We use the process described in Section 3.3 to determine the
strategic-reserve parameters in a scenario with static fuel prices,
zero demand growth, and thermal-only generation capacity: the
Deterministic Baseline Scenario. The purpose is to determine an
optimal strategic reserve for the starting situation of themodel. The
main source of uncertainty in this scenario arises from the power
producer's investment decisions, as described in Section 3.1. The
reserve volume is set at 6% (VSR); the corresponding dispatch price
(PSR) was calculated to be 800 V/MWh in the previous section.
When we run the model again, under the same Deterministic
Baseline Scenario, with the strategic reserve, we ﬁnd that the
reserve is dispatched 6.9 h annually on average. The supply ratio
increases by 5.3% (see Fig. 4) and the number of shortage hours isFig. 4. The supply ratio without (left) and with (right) a streduced by 95%e0.13 h per year (see Fig. 5). The strategic reserve
operator does not recuperate all the cost of contracting the reserve,
but this cost amounting to 0.23V/MWh is just 0.6% of the total cost
to consumer which is 39.33 V/MWh. As average prices are com-
parable to the situationwithout a strategic reserve, the average cost
to consumers remains comparable to the baseline scenario. These
results validate our method used for sizing the reserve.
Another observation is that in the presence of a strategic reserve
there is a more gradual rise and fall in the supply ratio in this static
scenario, as seen in Fig. 4. Comparing this result with the electricity
prices shown in Fig. 6 reveals that when the supply ratio starts to
decrease, the average electricity price rises as the reserve is acti-
vated more frequently. Although in some scenarios there are strong
swings in the electricity price, the median (see Fig. 4) and mean
(see Table 7 in the Appendix) of the price are lower with a strategic
reserve in the baseline scenario throughout the time horizon under
consideration.
At the beginning of the run with a strategic reserve, high elec-
tricity prices are observed. The reason is that at the start of the run,
the supply ratio is lower than the equilibrium level for the market
with a strategic reserve, so until new capacity gets built, the reserve
is activated more frequently than the long-term average. The sharp
decline in average price during the succeeding period also indicates
that the strategic reserve provides a strong incentive for investment
in new generation capacity (Fig. 6). In fact, the model indicates an
investment overshoot and subsequent dip in capacity; this points to
the need to phase in a reserve of this size in a system with a tight
supply ratio. The priceeduration curve in which the price data is
presented in a descending order of magnitude is illustrated in Fig. 7.
The average number of hours for every price level each year is
calculated based on the electricity price data obtained from the 120rategic reserve in a scenario without demand growth.
Fig. 5. Comparison of change in average shortage hours in scenario without demand growth (DET-BL) and with (DET-SR) a strategic reserve.
Table 1
Scenario parameters.
Scenario RES Strategic reserve
P.C. Bhagwat et al. / Utilities Policy 39 (2016) 13e2818Monte-Carlo runs for the given scenario. We observe a reduction in
the occurrence of sharp price peaks caused by scarcity, as expected
from theory.TM-BL e e
TM-SR e ✕
RES-BL ✕ e
RES-SR ✕ ✕4. Scenarios
We ﬁrst test the effectiveness of a strategic reserve in an envi-Fig. 6. Electricity prices in a scenario without demand growth, without (left) and with (right) a strategic reserve.
Fig. 7. Peak section of the priceeduration curve in a scenario without demand growth, without (DET-BL) and with a strategic reserve (DET-SR).ronment with uncertain demand growth and fuel prices. These
scenarios only include thermal power plants. Subsequently, we add
a growing share of variable renewable energy in order to answer
the main research question, namely how this relates to theeffectiveness of the reserve (See Table 1 for scenario parameters).
In all scenarios, a market with four identical power producers is
considered. The initial supply mix consists of four power-
generating technologies (Coal, CCGT, OCGT, and Nuclear). The
P.C. Bhagwat et al. / Utilities Policy 39 (2016) 13e28 19shares of the different technologies in the supply mix are based on
the power-generation capacity portfolio of Germany in 2010 (based
on Eurelectric (2012) data; see also Table 5 in the Appendix). The
load-duration function in this paper is based on the 2010 ENTSO-E
data for Germany. The coal and gas prices trends are based on
fossil-fuel scenarios published by Department of Energy and
Climate Change (2012). The biomass cost trends are based on
Faaij (2006) and those for lignite are based on Konstantin (2009).
Each scenario was run 120 times according to the Monte Carlo
method with the same starting conditions but with different fuel-
price and demand-growth assumptions. All scenarios consist of
40 time steps each of which represents one year. A triangular
probability distribution was used to create variations in electricity
demand growth and fuel prices around an average growth rate
(Table 4 in the Appendix). The TM scenario serves as a reference
case for understanding the effects of a strategic reserve under dy-
namic conditions.We run this scenario for a baseline casewithout a
strategic reserve (indicated as TM-BL) and for a casewith a strategic
reserve (indicated as TM-SR).
In our second scenario (‘RES’), the share of (variable) renewable
energy in the supply mix grows substantially (see Table 6 in the
Appendix). This is the key scenario for our analysis, which we use
for analyzing the effectiveness of a strategic reserve in the presence
of a growing share of renewable energy in the total generation
portfolio of the system. The renewable energy trends are based on
the German renewable energy action plan (NREAP, 2010) until 2020
and interpolated further. Aside from the share of renewable energy,
we use the same scenario as in the thermal-only case (TM). Again,
we make a baseline run for an energy-only market (RES-BL) and a
run with the same strategic reserve as before (RES-SR).
Estimating the value of lost load is difﬁcult (Cramton et al., 2013;
Stoft, 2002). The estimates of the value of lost load in literature
(Anderson and Taylor,1986; Baarsma and Hop, 2009; Leahy and Tol,
2011; Linares and Rey, 2013; Pachauri et al., 2011; Wilks and
Bloemhof, 2005) vary widely depending on the location and na-
ture of the load. In this modeling study, the value of lost load (VOLL)
was chosen at the relatively low level of 2000 V/MWh. We also
chose this level in order to take into account demand ﬂexibility that
might occur during periods of high prices.5. Results and analysis
5.1. Introduction
In this section, we present the results of running the above-
mentioned scenarios in our model. We applied the following in-
dicators to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategic reserve:
 Average electricity price (V/MWh): the average electricity price
over the entire run.
 Strategic-reserve dispatch duration (hour/year): the average
number of hours that the reserve is dispatched per year.
 Shortage hours (hour/year): the average number of hours per
year with scarcity prices, averaged over the entire run.
 Cost to consumers (V/MWh): the sum of the electricity price,
the net cost of the reserve, and cost of renewable policy (if
applicable) per unit of electricity consumed.3
 The cost of the strategic reserve (V/MWh): the net cost of
maintaining the strategic reserve to the system operator, which
is equal to the ﬁxed and operating costs of the reserveminus the3 Note that this includes the cost of outages, because in our model the electricity
price rises to the VOLL during shortages.revenues from operating it. (A negative value would indicate a
proﬁt to the operator.)
 Supply ratio: the ratio of available supply at peak over peak
demand.
 Outage cost per year (V/y): the product of the value of lost load
(2000 V/MWh) and the annual load not served (MWh). This
value indicates the cost to consumers due to shortages of supply.
An overview of the results of the simulation is presented
graphically in Fig. 8. Table 7 in the Appendix contains the average
values for the same variables over all runs. In the remainder of this
section, we discuss the results per scenario and graphically present
supply ratios, average electricity prices, and shortage hours over
time. For the supply ratios and electricity prices over time, the
median trend and the 50% and 90% conﬁdence intervals (CI) are
shown. The average values presented in the results are calculated as
annual values based on values from the 120 simulation runs over
the 40-year time horizon.
5.2. Thermal-only generation portfolio with demand growth
We test here whether the strategic reserve that we designed in
Section 3.2, is effective in a scenario with stochastically varying fuel
prices and growing demand (TM-SR). We compare the results for
the same scenario without a strategic reserve (TM-BL).
The presence of a strategic reserve leads to an increase of 5% in
the supply ratio, reducing the average number of shortage hours
per year by 84%, from12.9 h/y to 2.1 h/y (see Fig. 8 and Table 7 in the
Appendix). In Fig. 9, it can be observed that a strategic reserve
indeed improves the supply ratio. An overshoot in the supply ratio
is observed at the beginning of the simulation run in both the TM-
BL and TM-SR scenarios (see Fig. 9). This is because the agents in the
model cannot develop forecasts due to insufﬁcient information for
previous years. This initial cycle should be considered a model
artifact.
The strategic reserve is dispatched 34.3 h per year on average,
leading to a 1.7% rise in the electricity prices and a 2% increase in the
cost to consumers. The difference is caused by the cost of the
reserve (see also Table 7 in Appendix). It can be observed from
Fig. 10 that the presence of a strategic reserve leads to a consistent
reduction of shortages.
Even if the average supply ratio does not change, price cycles
increase the net income of the strategic reserve operator because
the reserve is used more frequently. This reduces the cost of
maintaining the strategic reserve as compared to the design case
(DET-SR) from 0.23 V/MWh to 0.14 V/MWh. In some scenarios,
there is a possibility of reserve imbalance and development of in-
vestment cycles. As illustrated by the priceeduration curve in
Fig. 11, the presence of the reserve leads to a reduction in occur-
rence of sharp price peaks caused by scarcity as expected from
theory. This can be further conﬁrmed from the mean and median
values shown in Fig. 12.
In a dynamic setting (TM), the strategic reserve is less effective
in improving the supply ratio and reducing shortage hours than in
the static design case (DET). The reason is that uncertainty about
future demand always causes some investment overshooting and
undershooting. However, the strategic reserve still reduces
shortage hours to 2.07 h per year, which corresponds to a decrease
in outage costs fromV48million toV8.5 million per year. However,
now the net cost to consumers is 48.34V/MWh, which is 2% higher
than in the baseline scenario (TM-BL). This rise in the cost to con-
sumers is equivalent to V564 million annually. Therefore, in this
case, the presence of a strategic reserve reduces net consumer
beneﬁt. The consumer beneﬁt from a reduction in shortages de-
pends on the value of loss load for individual consumers. We use a
Fig. 8. Comparison of indicators for the TM and RES scenarios (SR Duration stands for Strategic reserve dispatch duration).
Fig. 9. Supply ratio in a scenario with stochastically varying fuel prices and rising demand, without (left) and with a strategic reserve (right).
Fig. 10. The average number of shortage hours in a scenario with stochastic fuel prices and a rising demand, without (BL) and with a strategic reserve (SR).
P.C. Bhagwat et al. / Utilities Policy 39 (2016) 13e2820relatively low value of lost load (2000 V/MWh); the consumer
beneﬁt from reduced outage costs would be signiﬁcantly higher
with the use of a higher VOLL for this calculation.5.3. Generation portfolio with RES
The expansion of renewable energy increases the availability of
inexpensive but intermittent electricity, which reduces thewindowof opportunity for thermal power generators to recover their in-
vestment; scenarios RES-BL and RES-SR represent this case. In the
latter scenario, the size of the strategic reserve is the same as in the
thermal-only scenario of the previous section. This simulates a shift
from a completely thermal energy mix to a renewable energy mix
without a change in the design of the strategic reserve.
The presence of a high share of variable renewable energy de-
presses the investment incentive, as a result of which the number
Fig. 11. Peak section of the priceeduration curve in scenarios with stochastically varying fuel prices and rising demand, without (BL) and with a strategic reserve (SR).
Fig. 12. Electricity prices in a scenario with stochastic fuel prices and rising demand, without (left) and with a strategic reserve (right).
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to 23.0 h/y in RES-BL). Introducing a strategic reserve reduces the
number of shortage hours to 2.7 h/y on average, which corresponds
to a reduction in outage costs from V208 million to V12 million
annually (see Fig. 13).
On average, the strategic reserve was dispatched for 25.3 h per
year. Again, it improved the supply ratio by about 5% (see Fig. 9).
However, as can be observed in Fig. 14, although the strategic re-
serve's effectiveness over the ﬁrst 20 years is satisfactory, there is a
gradual decline in the supply ratio over the time horizon of the
simulation. The effectiveness of a strategic reserve in providing an
adequate investment incentive declines with the increasingly steep
residual load-duration curve that is the consequence of a growing
share of renewable energy in the portfolio. Therefore, in the longer,
it may be necessary to establish a more robust reserve by sizing theFig. 13. The average number of shortage hours per year in a dynamic scenareserve with a higher price or volume in the ﬁrst place or by
adjusting the reserve periodically. In the next section, the possible
resizing options available to the system operator are discussed.
Contrary to the thermal-only case, the presence of the reserve
led to an average reduction of electricity prices of 5%. Two main
factors contribute to this price reduction. First is the steep reduc-
tion in the period with scarcity prices (that is, shortage hours), as
explained above. Second is the higher availability of RES capacity in
off-peak segments combined with the larger generation capacity
available at the peak. Thus, for the same supply ratio, more capacity
would be available (at a cheaper price) in the off-peak segments of
the load-duration curve in a RES scenario as compared to the
thermal-only scenario. This not only reduces the number of hours
for which the reserve is active but it also pushes out the more
expensive thermal power plants from the merit order.rio with increasing RES, without (BL) and with a strategic reserve (SR).
Fig. 14. Supply ratio in a dynamic scenario having increasing RES without (left) and with a strategic reserve (right).
Fig. 15. Peak section of the priceeduration curve in the RES scenario, without (BL) and with a strategic reserve (SR).
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associated with a strong decline in the occurrence of extreme
price spikes, leading to more stable electricity prices, as was also
observed in the thermal-only scenario (see Fig. 16). The lower
prices increase the need for renewable energy subsidies, but a
net reduction in the cost to electricity consumers remains. This
2.7% net reduction in consumer costs is equivalent to V980
million per year. The reserve is used fewer hours than in the
thermal-only scenario (25 instead of 34 h per year on average)
because some of the demand peaks are met by variable renew-
able energy.
Comparing the overall effectiveness of a strategic reserve in a
thermal-only scenario with a scenario with increasing RES, it isFig. 16. Electricity prices in a dynamic scenario with an increasing sclear that the reserve performs better in a thermal-only scenario,
with a higher supply ratio and fewer shortage hours. However,
the relative improvement is greater in the case with high share
of renewable energy in the generation portfolio. While the
reserve becomes less effective in scenarios with renewable en-
ergy, the simulation results show that a strategic reserve can
provide a viable alternative for maintaining security of supply
during the early stages of this transition to low-carbon technol-
ogies at a relatively low cost to consumers. These results pertain
to a closed market, however; the effects of a reserve will ‘leak’
away across borders in strongly interconnected markets. We
intend to investigate these cross-border effects in future
research.hare of RES, without (left) and with (right) a strategic reserve.
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effectiveness
In order to explore the impact of the size and the dispatch priceFig. 17. The effects of different reserve volumes (left side) and dispatch prices (right side) on
to consumer and reserve dispatch hours.of the strategic reserve on reliability, we ran our model with
different price and volume combinations. This analysis also pro-
vides insight into possible options for improving the effectiveness
of the strategic reserve as the share of renewable energy grows.the average number of shortage hours, the supply ratio, the cost of the reserve, the cost
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either the price or the volume of the strategic reserve and Fig. 17
shows the results. Within runs, the reserve parameters were kept
constant. In the ﬁrst case, illustrated by the left-side graphs in
Fig. 17, the reserve price was kept at 800 V/MWh and the reserve
volume was varied between 2.5% and 20% of peak demand in in-
crements of 2.5%. In the second case, illustrated by the right-side
graphs in Fig. 17, the reserve volume was ﬁxed at 6% and the
reserve price was varied from 200 V/MWh to 1800 V/MWh with
increments of 200 V/MWh.
The impact of changes in the reserve dimensions on the net cost
of the strategic reserve, on the average number of shortage hours
and on the supply ratio, are illustrated in Fig. 17. Increasing either
the volume or the price of the reserve, while keeping the other
variable constant, causes the supply ratio to increase and shortages
to decline. The impact on the cost of the strategic reserve is less
clear. The effectiveness of the strategic reserve is more sensitive to
changes in volume than to changes in dispatch prices. The number
of shortage hours comes close to zerowith a reserve size of 10%. The
trends shown Fig. 17E indicate that an increase in the volume of
capacity contracted into the reserve leads to higher utilization of
the strategic reserve, causing prolonged periods of high prices and
thus increasing the ﬁnal cost to consumer by more than when the
reserve price is increased (see Fig. 17D and I).
When the reserve volume is increased, the number of hours that
the reserve is dispatched per year increases at more than a linear
rate, as it crowds out other generators (Fig. 17E.). The cost of con-
tracting the reserve to the system operator increases at ﬁrst, but
begins to decline when the contracted reserve volume is beyond a
certain level (Fig. 17C). At this point, the revenue earned by the
operator is higher than the cost of contracting additional capacity,
leading to a reduction in the overall cost of contracting the reserve to
the operator. A reserve volume that exceeds the optimal level leads
to a reduction in the cost incurred by the operator for contracting
the reserve. However, the increased reserve dispatch duration due to
the higher reserve volume causes a considerable rise in the cost to
consumers, which means that a very large reserve volume would
not be an efﬁcient solution from the consumer-cost perspective. An
excessive reserve volume, given the reserve dispatch price (PSR),
constitutes an abuse of market power to raise wholesale electricity
prices beyond what is needed to attract investment; it recovers
more cost but negatively affects consumer welfare. The cost of the
reserve is lowest at a reserve volume of 15% of peak demand. Even
then, the net cost of the strategic reserve is only about 1% of the
average wholesale electricity price. Increasing the reserve price is
not as effective in reducing shortages or increasing the supply ratio,
as is indicated by Fig. 17 (Fig. 17A, F, B and G).
It is observed from Fig. 17 (Subﬁgure D1) that in the presence of
growing RES, the cost to consumers is lowest when the reserve
volume is around 7.5%. This is higher than the 6% volume that was
calculated for a thermal-only scenario with the same reserve price.
This indicates that a larger reserve volume would be required in
order to minimize the cost to consumer in the presence of growing
RES as compared to a thermal-only scenario.
A comparison of the results from the design parameter analyses
indicates that increasing the reserve volume would be the most
effectiveway of improving the effectiveness of a strategic reserve in
a scenario with a growing share of RES. However, a large strategic
reserve could conﬂict with the intended neutrality of the system
operator vis-a-vis market parties.
5.5. Model limitations
The model does not consider any exercise of market power and
generators are assumed to bid at marginal costs at all times. Therisk that generation companies might withhold capacity when the
supply ratio is tight, in order to activate the reserve and thereby
increase the price, has not been taken into account. Generation
companies might be able to withhold just enough capacity to
activate the reserve, leading to an increase in the number of hours
with high prices. This is a real risk that could cause signiﬁcant in-
come transfers from consumers to producers. This risk also exists in
energy-only markets, but there the number of shortage hours is
relatively small compared to the number of hours that a strategic
reserve is activated, so the number of hours during which capacity
withholding might occur is much larger in the presence of a stra-
tegic reserve.
In this paper we studied a closed system with no in-
terconnections. In practice, interconnections with neighboring
markets could reduce the effectiveness of the strategic reserve due
to the leakage of the reserve's beneﬁts to the interconnected region.
In future research, we plan to study these cross-border effects. As
here we modeled the long-term development of the market, short-
term operational constraints and unforeseen shutdowns are
ignored. Grid constraints and congestion management are also
outside the scope of this analysis. Moreover, the robustness of a
strategic reserve in the context of black-swan events should be
studied in greater detail.
6. Conclusions
We present a model of a strategic reserve with which we
analyze its dynamic effectiveness without and with a large share of
renewable energy in the portfolio. We present a method for
determining the parameters of a strategic reserve based on Stoft
(2002). A strategic reserve can have a stabilizing effect on an
electricity market in a reasonably cost-effective manner, depending
on the scenario. Early investment incentives improve the supply
ratio and therefore reduce shortages.
In our model, a strategic reserve increases the net cost of elec-
tricity supply to consumers in a scenario without variable renew-
able energy, but in the presence of a high volume of variable
renewable energy, it reduces the cost to consumers because it has a
stabilizing effect on investment cycles in thermal power generation
capacity.
We ﬁnd two problems with a strategic reserve. First, there is a
risk of extended periods of high average electricity prices if the
reserve fails to attract sufﬁcient investment. For instance, imperfect
investment decisions, for example due to uncertainty regarding
future demand growth, may still cause an investment cycle,
resulting in high average electricity prices in some years. Second,
the effectiveness of the reserve with respect to maintaining gen-
eration adequacy appears to decrease as the share of variable
renewable energy grows. In the latter case, the reserve may need to
be redesigned or replaced by an alternative capacity mechanism.
The effectiveness of the reserve may be improved by increasing
its volume. Increasing the dispatch price is less effective. A larger
volume also may improve the reserve's cost recovery rate, given a
certain reserve dispatch price, but this would reﬂect an abuse of the
reserve's market power and reduce consumer welfare. Our long-
term model of a strategic reserve also reveals what we describe
as the dismantling paradox. When a reserve contains old units that
should be dismantled, the presence of the reservemay cause undue
life extension, whether these units are contracted in the reserve or
not.
We plan to extend this research by analyzing the impact of
strategic reserves on carbon emissions reduction as well as cross-
border effects, including the interaction between a strategic
reserve and a capacity market implemented in two interconnected
countries.
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Assumptions for power generation technologies
Technology Capacity
[MW]
Construction time
[years]
Permit time
[years]
Technical lifetime
[years]
Depre
[years
Coal 758 4 1 50 20
CCGT 776 2 1 40 15
OCGT 150 0.5 0.5 30 15
Nuclear 1000 7 2 40 25
IGCC 758 4 1 50 20
Wind
Offshore
600 2 1 25 15
PV 100 2 1 25 15
Wind
Onshore
600 1 1 25 15
Biomass 500 3 1 40 15
CCGTCCS 600 3 1 40 15
CoalCCS 600 4 1 50 20
Lignite 1000 5 1 50 20
Biogas 500 3 1 40 15
IGCCCCS 600 4 1 50 20ciation time
]
Minimum running
hours
Base
availability [%]
Peak
availability [%]
Fuels
5000 1 1 Coal, Biomass
(10%)
0 1 1 Gas
0 1 1 Gas
5000 1 1 Uranium
0 1 1 Coal, Biomass
(10%)
0 0.6 0.07 e
0 0.2 0.04 e
0 0.4 0.05 e
5000 1 1 Biomass
0 1 1 Gas
5000 1 1 Coal, Biomass
(10%)
5000 1 1 Lignite
0 1 1 Biomass
0 1 1 Coal, Biomass
(10%)
Table 6
Development of the supply-mix in scenario with growing RES
Scenario V Scenario VI Scenario V Scenario VI
Technology Initial mix Final mix Final mix Final capacity (MW) Final capacity (MW)
Coal 50.0% 11.0% 10.7% 40136.1 39,548.7
CCGT 19.0% 8.2% 8.0% 29,772.5 29,533.3
OCGT 13.0% 1.5% 3.4% 5413.8 12,758.8
Nuclear 18.0% 3.0% 3.0% 11,083.3 11,141.7
IGCC e 1.5% 1.6% 5577.6 5760.8
Wind Offshore e 10.7% 10.5% 39,043.4 38,810.4
PV e 51.1% 50.2% 186,349.4 185,929.8
Wind e 11.3% 11.1% 41,133.7 40,935.0
Biomass e 1.6% 1.6% 5941.2 5846.9
CCGTCCS e e e 0.0 0.0
CoalCCS e e e 0.0 0.0
Lignite e e e 0.0 0.0
Biogas e e e 0.0 0.0
IGCCCCS e e e 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 364,451.0 370,265.2
Table 7
Annual average values of key indicators for the deterministic scenarios
Scenario
name
Cost to consumer
(V/MWh)
Electricity price
(V/MWh)
Cost of SR
(V/MWh)
RES support
(V/MWh)
Shortage hours
(h/yr)
SR duration
(h/yr)
Outage cost (million
V/yr)
Supply
ratio
DET-BL 39.36 39.36 N.A. N.A. 2.82 N.A. 4 1.01
DET-SR 39.33 39.09 0.23 N.A. 0.13 6.9 0.17 1.06
TM-BL 47.39 47.39 N.A. N.A. 12.87 N.A. 48 1.01
TM-SR 48.34 48.20 0.14 N.A. 2.07 34.3 8.5 1.06
RES-BL 57.54 46.38 N.A. 11.168 22.96 N.A. 208 0.98
RES-SR 55.97 44.10 0.16 11.711 2.67 25.3 12.8 1.03
Table 3
Description of scenario abbreviations
SR NO Code Description
1 TM Thermal Mix only
2 RES Renewable energy policy enabled
3 BL Baseline energy-only market
4 SR Strategic reserve implemented
5 DET Determination of reserve scenario
Table 4
Fuel price and demand price growth rate assumptions
Type Unit Coal Gas Lignite Uranium Biomass Demand
Start V/GJ 3.6 9.02 1.428 1.29 4.5 e
Lower [%] 3 6 1 0 3 1
Upper [%] 5 8 1 2 5 5
Average [%] 1 1.5 0 1 1 2
Table 5
Initial supply mix for all scenarios
Technology Coal CCGT OCGT Nuclear
% Share 50.0% 19.0% 13.0% 18.0%
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